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possible, perhaps inexorable, changes in the structure of courts. 
Specifically, studies of court-ways need to pay more attention to the 
following: 
1. The effects of the size of an appellate bench and how the 
number and rotation of judges affect law and decisionmaking. 
2. The housing and geographical location of appellate courts 
as related to collegial interaction. One thinks, for example, of the 
differences between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and that for 
the District of Columbia Circuit and how important those differ-
ences are for collegial decisionmaking. 
3. The rise of what some judges lament as "bureaucratic 
justice" -how the increase in the number of law clerks and staff 
attorneys affects collegial decisionmaking, the traditional role of ne-
gotiation and compromise, and opinion writing. 
4. Finally, a related issue, the consequences of introducing 
modem office managerial practices and equipment during the last 
ten to fifteen years. How are "court ways" changing due to the 
greater reliance on modem office technology? 
From my perspective as a political scientist, such empirical re-
search deserves as much (if not more) attention as that presently 
given to normative debates over theories of judicial review. 
JOHN H. GARVEY29 
1. It used to be that big shot legal academics wrote casebooks 
and treatises when they tired of writing for the law reviews. They 
now do books for university presses. There are many reasons for 
this. Treatises are out of fashion because there is too much law and 
it has lost its structure. Scholars are interested in either "decon-
structing" or "rethinking" the law. Neither of these enterprises ap-
peals to law firms, which buy a large fraction of the law reviews. 
Such writers are also often big thinkers (like treatise writers in their 
own way) and their oeuvre is too big for periodicals. Too, footnotes 
are less important for deconstructors and rethinkers, and the law 
reviews' addiction to them is annoying. (For shorter pieces such 
people flee to Constitutional Commentary, Ethics, Nomos, Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs, Social Philosophy & Policy, etc., where cita-
tion obligations are more relaxed.) 
I have several reflections about this change in the form of 
scholarship. One is that these books are hard for law library pa-
trons to find. If I'm doing research on judicial review or equal pro-
tection I can't find books on the subject through the Index to Legal 
29. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
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Periodicals or the Current Law Index. Just book reviews. I can use 
the card catalogue of the main library to locate authors and titles, 
but the subject indexes are no good for lawyers. The copyright laws 
and the market have inhibited libraries from putting the full texts of 
books on computers for Boolean searches, as Lexis and Westlaw 
have done with cases and statutes. Books In Print has a fair subject 
guide, but it drops titles after about four years. The best bet for 
those near a university library is to hook up by modem with the 
National Union Catalogue. If they have at least one title already 
they can do the electronic equivalent of looking at books on the 
same shelf in the Library of Congress. But that won't help most 
lawyers, and the system is at the mercy of nonlawyers who do the 
cataloguing. Perhaps something could be done to make this kind of 
writing more accessible. 
And speaking about accessibility, I think it would do marvels 
for the popularity of the genre if it were all written in English. Peo-
ple don't have to sound like Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Habermas, 
and Derrida in order to talk about them. There is an analogy to 
this in the way first-year law students talk. Jargon has a peculiar 
fascination for those who don't quite know what it means; but good 
lawyers can make hard things clear. Perhaps it is conceit, but I 
have reached the stage in my life where I think that if I can't under-
stand what you are trying to say, it's your fault. 
2. Interpretation problems have been the rage for ten years. 
They now get some notice in the casebooks, and have even made 
TV 
in the Bork hearings. We have articulated a range of interpretive 
principles. From right to left they cover intent, text, structure, pre-
cedent, tradition, process, conventional morality, emerging "tradi-
tions," moral theory, and power. I have two complaints about this 
brand of scholarship. One is the tendency (especially on the left) to 
be disingenuous about the subject of intent. The other is the failure 
(more noticeable on the right) to address issues of justification. 
As to intent, the left perceptively has noted real problems of 
ambiguity and just plain indeterminacy that any such theory faces. 
Whose intent? At what level of generality? Is the idea of a group 
intention meaningful? Can we retrieve it even if it is? But it is odd 
that these questions are raised about constitutional interpretation 
yet ignored in the reading of statutes. We are willing to make his-
torical group intentions the key to unconstitutionality under the es-
tablishment clause (Wallace v. Jaffree) and the equal protection 
clause (Hunter v. Underwood). The left on the Court would like to 
do the same even in "old" equal protection cases (Railroad Retire-
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ment Bd. v. Fritz; Schweiker v. Wilson). Here the problems of as-
certainability are also grave. This leads me to believe that people 
have other reasons for rejecting intent as a tool in constitutional 
interpretation.3o 
There are good reasons for doing so, and this leads me to my 
second point. By and large we have treated the issue of interpreta-
tion as a problem of meaning and have neglected the related prob-
lem of justification. Suppose we could determine the framers' group 
intention about the first amendment. We still need to explain why 
we should prefer that understanding of the text over other plausible 
candidates. We need to explain why the thoughts of a few people 
long dead should govern our behavior today. These are issues of 
political morality, but they enter into the conventions that govern 
our understanding of texts like the Constitution.3J (Think about the 
interpretation of wills. There too we use conventions that often ig-
nore the author's intentions in order to serve a moral theory about 
the distribution of property.) 
3. Here is a more concrete problem. People who do constitu-
tional interpretation in the manner of Justice Black are unfazed by 
technological change. I am not one of them, and I think that cable 
television could change the way we think about the first amend-
ment. At present most of us subscribe to the notion that govern-
ment can regulate the market for goods but should stay out of the 
market for ideas. We are free speech marketeers. The FCC thinks 
that changes in communications technology now give us more rea-
son than ever to feel this way. So it has dumped the fairness doc-
trine and revised the rules requiring cable operators to carry 
broadcast signals. Lower courts recite the virtues of competition as 
a reason for loosening the strings that cities have used to tie up 
cable operators. These include rules about franchising and rules 
about access to the medium. I think this may all be a mistake. 
Cable is both a great picture and a natural monopoly, and the result 
of a laissez-faire approach may be that in ten years there will be 
only one speaker in town. This will matter a lot at election time 
because winning is tied to a candidate's TV budget. The cable oper-
ator could become the twenty-first century version of the political 
boss. I would like to see more writing about cable, and about how 
we could understand the first amendment in a regulated market. 
30. I should add that conservative members of the Court feel less bound to intent in 
statutory cases (Flemming v. Nestor; Michael M. v. Superior Court). They too are affected 
by other norms in their theories of interpretation. 
31. See Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72 CoRNELL 
L. REV. 745 (1987); Lyons, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. 
& PoL'Y 75 (1986). 
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(We might apply this understanding to the problem of campaign 
financing too.) 
4. First-year constitutional law courses spend a lot of time on 
questions of federalism, and the chief concern in those discussions is 
whether there are limits to the federal government's power. I often 
wonder whether we are wasting our time in these debates. The 
most interesting development along these lines is Congress's in-
creasingly common use of "crossover conditions" on government 
spending. These are conditions that have nothing to do with how 
federal money is spent. Congress has tied highway funds to the 
minimum drinking age (South Dakota v. DOT), education aid to 
draft registration (the Solomon Amendment), and sewage treatment 
grants to clean air (Clean Air Act). The proposed Civil Rights Res-
toration Act will impose new nondiscrimination obligations on re-
cipients who get any kind of federal money. One can imagine 
connections between these grants and their conditions but it's get-
ting hard. A lot of state and local officials and a handful of academ-
ics have pointed out the problem. No one has proposed a natural 
stopping place. Is there no limit to regulatory uses of the spending 
power? 
5. I wish somebody not teaching at Chicago would write 
about the contracts clause. 
RICHARD E. MORGAN32 
I was browsing recently in an obscure Ph.D. thesis on free 
speech theory, when the following sentence leapt out at me: "What 
are the obligations owed between persons who cannot agree on fun-
damentals?" The young George Will was reflecting on the agonies 
of the pre-Civil War generation, but the questions strike me as pre-
cisely relevant today. A year of Bicentennial debating and paneling 
has convinced me of what I had suspected for some time-that 
there is deeper disagreement over the "fundamentals" of the Consti-
tution of the United States, over its substance understood as the 
meaning of its provisions, than at any time since the 1850s. 
There is decreasing common ground between the variety of in-
terpretivists (who argue that if a reasonably clear, historically-
grounded content cannot be found in a provision of the Constitu-
tion then the party relying on the Constitution fails) and those who 
would apply the "open-ended" and "majestic" phrases of the Con-
stitution according to our own best lights in an effort to vindicate 
the general values thought to have been subscribed to by the fram-
32. Professor of History, Bowdoin College. 
